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Abstract 
The paper addresses the issue of banking supervision organization and realization in Ukraine based on world’s 
experience on the subject. Also the problem of potential modernization of banking supervision institutional base is 
explained taking into account the supervision authorities practices and banking system functioning in some European 
countries. The impact of central banks on the national systems of banking supervision is discussed. The conclusion is 
drawn that there is no clear tendency in relation to supervisory models; every country chooses an acceptable 
institutional structure depending on the specifics of its national economy, development trends in the credit system and 
its financial market. 
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Introduction♦ 
Today the study and implementation of the basic 
principles of effective banking supervision 
introduced by the “Basel II” system are among the 
most important tasks for banking supervisory 
authorities in Ukraine. Ukrainian experts offer 
different opinions about the dates of Ukraine’s 
transition to these principles. The management of 
the National Bank of Ukraine believes that the 
banking system of Ukraine will be ready for 
transition to the new standards not earlier than in 
2016. In bankers’ opinion the implementation of 
these principles by the United States, Russia and 
countries of the European Union, as well as 
Ukraine’s joining the World Trade Organization 
will necessitate the rapid modernization of the 
existing system of banking supervision in 
accordance with the new rules. 
The basic principles of banking supervision 
envisage the introduction of new methods for 
banking supervisory authorities, as well as the 
reconstruction of the existing relations between the 
banking supervisory authorities of the National 
Bank of Ukraine and banks of the second level of 
Ukrainian banking system. 
1. Basic material 
According to the first principle of Basel ІІ, an 
effective system of banking supervision should 
determine the activity of all state authorities 
engaged in the banking supervision. Every 
administrative body must possess its operational 
independence, carry out its activity transparently, 
have a strong management and adequate resources 
in order to perform its duties. Also, it is necessary to 
ensure the effective legislative field for banking 
supervision, which has to regulate the issues of 
banks’ formation and subsequent control of their 
performance. The legislation on banking supervision 
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must ensure the protection of supervisors, exchange 
of information and confidentiality. The 
implementation of these principles envisages the 
development of both an adequate methodology and 
a proper model of the institutional system of 
banking supervision in the country.  
In this connection, it is expedient to study the world 
trends in relation to institutional foundations of 
banking supervisory systems. The goal of this paper 
is to provide recommendations relating to possible 
modernization of institutional foundations of 
Ukrainian banking supervision considering the 
experience of banking supervision in some 
European countries. 
Banking supervision dates back to more than one 
hundred years ago. During this period several 
models of supervisory systems were developed. 
Three basic models can be identified (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Models of supervisory 
systems  
Sector model: 
 
- banking sector control 
authority  
- insurance sector control 
authority 
- investment sector 
control authority 
 
Two-tier model: 
 
- organ of prudential 
control over all sectors 
- regulation authority 
 
 
Model of common 
authority: 
 
- a single organ  
controls and 
regulates all sectors 
 
 
Fig. 1. Models of supervision systems 
In case of the sector model, every sector (bank, 
insurance, investment) is controlled by a separate 
organ. Although in recent years some countries have 
abandoned this model (see Table 1) it is still widely 
used in 6 EU member states (Greece, Spain, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), and also with some 
modifications in France, Portugal, Finland and 
Luxemburg. One of these countries, Poland, is in the 
process of transition to a single board of 
supervision. As a variation of this model, in Finland 
and Luxemburg the supervision of both banking and 
investment sectors is carried out by a single 
supervisory authority. 
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Table 1. The structure of supervision in the EU 
states and countries joining the EU 
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Belgium 0  Х 1  
Czech Republic 0  Х 1 Х 
Denmark   Х 1  
Germany   Х 1 Х 
Estonia   Х 1  
Greece Х   3 Х 
Spain Х   3 Х 
France Х Х  4  
Ireland   Х 1  
Italy Х Х  4 Х 
Cyprus Х   4 Х 
Latvia   Х 1  
Lithuania Х   3 Х 
Luxemburg  Х   2  
Hungary   Х 1  
Malta   Х 1  
The Netherlands  Х  2 Х 
Austria   Х 1 Х 
Poland 0  Х 1  
Portugal Х Х  3 Х 
Slovenia Х   3 Х 
Slovakia 0  Х 1 Х 
Finland Х   2  
Sweden   Х 1  
Great Britain   Х 1  
Bulgaria  Х   2 Х 
Romania  Х   4 Х 
Total 12 4 14   
Note: the arrow means changes after June 2003. 
In the second model, the duties are redistributed on 
the basis of supervisory tasks, with the prudential 
supervision and business regulation controlled by 
two different organs of power (so called two-tier 
model). This model is fully used only in one country 
– the Netherlands. The elements of this model are 
also represented in the structure of supervision in 
France and Portugal. 
In the third model, all supervision functions are 
concentrated in one supervisory authority, which 
covers both the prudential supervision and 
protection of investors. This model is widely used 
by the new EU members. Some of them have 
established a new organ of supervision, separated 
from central bank (Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, 
Malta), while others have delegated all functions 
of financial market supervision to their central 
banks (Czech Republic, Slovakia). In some cases 
the existence of a relatively small financial 
market seemed to be a reason behind the creation 
of a single administration responsible for the 
supervision of financial market. 
There is an interesting example of banking 
supervision in Switzerland, which is actually the 
third model of banking supervision. However, 
banking supervision in Switzerland is based on the 
distribution of tasks between the Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission (SFBC), which is a state 
supervisory authority, and a few authorized auditing 
firms (see Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2. Organizational structure of banking supervisory authorities in Switzerland 
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The Commission is independent in relation to the 
Federal Government and is not part of the 
governmental administration. Administratively it is 
integrated in the Federal Department of Finance. 
However, the Commission conducts the control over 
separate parts of financial sector independently. 
Historical responsibility for the control of the 
banking sector had an influence on the expansion of 
controlling powers over all financial sectors. Today, 
the Commission performs the following tasks: 
♦ control over banks and securities’ dealers; 
♦ control over auditing firms, which carry out 
the audit of financial market structural 
subdivisions;  
♦ control over collective investment schemes; 
♦ control of mortgage business; 
♦ control of securities market;  
♦ ensuring the transparency of information 
about owners and dividends of joint-stock 
companies operating in the financial sector; 
♦ control of financial sector with the purpose of 
preventing money-laundering; 
♦ making decisions relating to bankruptcies and 
restructuring of banks and securities dealers. 
Along with its basic functions, the Commission also 
operates in other branches of financial and credit 
sector. It maintains contacts with the Federal 
Department of Finance, Swiss National Bank, 
Association of Swiss Banks, Associations of Swiss 
Funds, and others. 
The goals of the Commission’s activities are the 
creditors protection, investors protection, guaranteeing 
the functioning of investment funds and ensuring the 
performance of functions (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) activities 
Creditors protection Investors protection Functioning of securities markets Support of functions performance 
Minimization of expenses for private 
investors  
Protection of confidence for 
individual and collective investors 
Transparence of markets System’s stability 
Protection of customers Transparence of investments Balanced circulation of market’s 
participants  
Support of confidence  
Prevention of unlicensed deposit collection 
from physical and legal persons  
Saving of customers’ assets  
 
Protection of minority 
shareholders 
Support of reputation 
Effective reorganization and liquidation Balanced circulation Protection from illegal dividend 
distribution 
Support in crime fighting 
Indirect protection of owners, including 
taxpayers (in the case of public 
corporations) 
Prevention of conflict of interests - International competition 
- Protection from unauthorized 
participants  
- Protection from unauthorized  
participants 
 
Audit companies have a license to perform the 
functions of control in relation to banks, investment 
and financial companies.  
In accordance with the two-level system, the 
authorized audit firms conduct guest auditing, while 
the SFBC Commission is accountable for general 
supervision and measures of influence.  
The relations between the audit firms authorized by 
the Commission and financial institutions passing an 
audit are determined by civil law. As a federal 
administrative authority, the SFBC Commission has 
all the necessary powers of a state body, but in 
monitoring the activity of different institutions it 
relies on the information provided by authorized 
auditors. Only in special cases the SFBC 
Commission can conduct direct audits.  
The Commission’s task is the cooperation with the 
Swiss National Bank, which is responsible for the 
system’s stability.  
The banking system in Switzerland is very 
concentrated, with mostly foreign banks operating 
in the country. Therefore, in this case a single 
authority model is fully justified.  
National supervisory authorities in the EU countries 
have to speed up the convergence of supervision and 
regulation in the EU. All central banks (regardless 
of whether they have supervisory duties or not) take 
part in the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS). 
A common trend in supervisory systems of the 
European countries is the reduction in the number of 
supervisory organs (see Table 1). It is explained by 
both the rationalization of tasks distribution among 
different authorities (as in France) and by the 
concentration of supervisory functions (Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia). However, it is 
impossible to identify a general trend towards a 
specific type of supervisory system.  
The analysis confirms that, on the whole, central 
banks are widely engaged in supervisory 
activities. The number of countries, where central 
banks have supervisory powers, is growing. 
Czech Republic and Slovakia have transformed 
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their central banks into single supervisory 
authorities over financial markets. 
The reasons for the transfer of all supervisory duties 
to central banks are as follows: 
♦ independence; 
♦ protection of the EU Agreement;  
♦ credit solvency; 
♦ experience of specialists.  
Almost all EU member states, in which central 
banks are not responsible for making final decisions 
in the area of banking supervision, have, 
nonetheless, mechanisms that guarantee the 
participation of central banks in this process. Firstly, 
two central banks (Germany and Austria) are 
authorized by law to carry out the supervision of 
credit institutions (see Table 1). Secondly, as Table 
3 shows, there is a wide spectrum of institutional 
agreements with a number of possibilities including 
joint use of personnel (Belgium, France, Ireland, 
Latvia), financial budget (Belgium, France, Latvia) 
or other resources as in Italy, and databases 
(Belgium, Estonia, France, Ireland, Latvia, Finland, 
Great Britain).  
Three central banks can be authorized to carry out 
some supervisory tasks (Ireland, Latvia and 
Hungary). Finally, in nine countries (Belgium, 
Estonia, France, Latvia, Austria, Poland, Finland, 
Sweden and Great Britain) central banks are 
engaged in the banking supervision and have the 
following rights: authority to appoint some board 
members of banking supervisory administrations 
(Austria), or make recommendations relating to 
such appointments to government authorities 
(Finland, Latvia).  
It is also worth noting that almost all EU states have 
formal agreements about cooperation and exchange 
of information between central banks and banking 
supervision authorities. On the whole, national 
central banks play an important role in ensuring 
financial stability, even if they are not engaged in 
prudential supervision. However, every country in 
the European Union chooses different methods for 
the formalization of cooperation: memorandum of 
understanding, cooperation committees or 
cooperation agreement. 
In Estonia, Ireland and Finland banking supervision 
is performed by independent bodies. However, they 
include some of the central banks personnel. 
Regarding the joint use of personnel it should be 
noted that:  
♦ in Belgium the law requires from the National 
Bank and the Supervisory authority for the 
Belgian financial sector (CBFA) to combine 
certain types of activities and personnel on 
conditions stipulated by the Royal Decree and 
Memorandum of Understanding between the 
CBFA and the central bank;  
♦ in Latvia the Financial and Capital Market 
Commission (FCMC) and the Bank of Latvia 
have common representatives in Brussels (who 
work at the permanent representative office of 
Latvia in Brussels). According to the cooperation 
agreement, the representatives devote 30 per cent 
of their work time to issues concerning the 
FCMC interests. This agreement stipulates that 
the FCMC compensates to the Bank of Latvia 30 
per cent of all its expenses, which are bound up 
with the presence of the representative office in 
Brussels;  
♦ in Poland the executive branch of the Banking 
Supervisory Commission is financed and 
provided with personnel by the National Bank 
of Poland. 
 
Table1 3. Cooperation agreements between central banks, which do not conduct supervision, and supervisory 
authorities in the EU countries1  
Country Central bank takes part in 
the management of 
banking supervision 
Joint use of personnel Common resources 
of financial budget 
Other joint use of 
resources 
Central banks perform 
certain operational 
tasks 
Belgium X X X X  
Estonia X   X  
France X X X X  
Ireland  X  X X 
Latvia X X X X X 
Hungary     X 
Poland X X X   
Finland  X   X  
Sweden  X     
Great Britain X   X  
                                                 
1 Made on the materials of Е. Хюпкес, М. Квинтин, М.У. Тейлор “Механизмы подотчетности органов регулирования финансового сектора” 
// www.imf.org 
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Central banks may take part in certain budgetary 
and financial affairs, which concern banking 
supervision: 
♦ in Belgium the law requires definite resources 
for achieving a synergy effect; 
♦ beginning from January 1, 2007 the FCMC 
Commission in Latvia is financed exclusively 
with the funds of the supervised market 
participants in proportions set by the law 
about the Commission. 
Central banks in Germany and Austria are 
authorized by law to perform specific supervisory 
tasks. The National Bank of Austria conducts 
inspections of banks along with the Financial 
Market Authority (FMA), provides expert conclu-
sions, analyzes supervisory reports and assesses 
bank risks. In Germany the Bundesbank and the 
German Financial Supervisory Authority (BAFIN) 
are authorized to work closely in the sphere of 
banking supervision.  
In Estonia, Ireland and Finland banking supervision 
is carried out by independent entities, however, they 
include representatives of central banks.  
Conclusions for Ukraine 
In the European countries there is a clear tendency 
towards consolidation of supervisory authorities on 
the national level with the purpose to improve their 
efficiency. In our opinion, the main reasons for the 
unification of supervisory responsibility are the 
disappearance of clear borders between financial 
sectors or the existence of relatively small financial 
markets.  
The choice of every country depends on its history, 
constitutional peculiarities or other factors regarding 
its national financial sector.  
However, there is no obvious tendency in relation to 
supervisory models; every country chooses an 
acceptable institutional structure depending on the 
specifics of its national economy, development 
trends in the credit system and its financial market.  
Governments bear the sole responsibility for the 
establishment of national supervisory systems. 
However, there are some political level agreements 
about the improvement of cooperation and 
convergence among European supervision 
authorities. 
In one way or another, central banks perform direct 
supervisory functions almost in all national 
supervisory systems. In some EU countries there are 
agreements, which stipulate the joint use of budget, 
personnel or other resources by central banks and 
supervision authorities.  
In keeping with the current European trend of 
improved cooperation between supervisory 
structures, almost all EU members are trying to 
reach formal agreements for ensuring cooperation 
and information exchange between central banks 
and banking supervisory authorities.  
De facto Ukraine has the first model of supervision in 
which the spheres of activity of supervisory authorities 
are divided according to the sectors of financial 
market. However, the development of the banking 
system demonstrates the growth of tendencies towards 
universalization of bank activities, the necessity of 
concentration and centralization of capital of the 
national banking system.  
The environment of the Ukrainian banking system is 
very competitive: no bank has a dominant position 
in a separate sphere of activity.  
The dynamics of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) for Ukraine shows a low level of asset 
concentration, in particular, of credit portfolio and 
capital (Fig. 3). This index is similar to the indices 
in the UK, France and Italy, and it is better than that 
in Spain, Austria, Sweden and many other countries.  
The index of concentration of the market of physical 
persons’ resources is higher, but it is also indicative 
of the minimal concentration. 
However, we can see the reduction of monopolistic 
tendencies in the banking sector. For credit portfolio 
the HHI fell by 0,0008 points, for assets – by 0,0033 
points, for resources of physical persons – by 0,0128 
points. The HHI for balance capital had a 
considerable growth – by 0,084 points. This 
demonstrates the unevenness of capital 
accumulation by banks. 
The growth of this index in the European Monetary 
Union is indicative of decline in the banking sector 
competition and the growth of monopolistic 
tendencies (Table 4). 
It is necessary for Ukraine to develop the legislative 
and institutional basis of the stock-market activity, 
the infrastructure of investment funds and other 
elements of the banking system.  
At the moment the National Bank of Ukraine studies 
the possibility to introduce the monetary regime of 
inflation targeting, which envisages the coordination 
of activities of the Government and the National 
Bank of Ukraine in ensuring the implementation of 
the declared principles in relation to the level of 
prices in the country. The realization of these plans 
will result in the necessity of unification of 
supervisory functions in a single organ. 
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Source: The National Bank of Ukraine.  
Fig. 3. Indicators of banking sector concentration in Ukraine in 2004-2006 (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)) 
Table 4. Indicators of banking sector concentration in the Euro zone in 1999-2006 (Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Indicator: Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) 0,062 0,0066 0,0068 0,0067 0,0070 0,0072 0,0078 0,0078 
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